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Introduction 
 
In recent decades, Argentina’s rural areas have undergone a major transformation. The 
process of agriculturalization, begun in the 1970s, intensified markedly in the mid-1990s 
following the deregulation of the agricultural sector, the presence of high international prices 
for agricultural products, and the introduction of new technologies. Argentina ceased to 
have a widely diversified agricultural sector that satisfied both internal and external demand 
and, instead, specialized in a small number of export commodities (Barsky and Fernández 
2005; Teubal 2008). Among these, soybeans became particularly important. The surface area 
planted with the crop increased from approximately six million hectares (ha) in the 1995/96 
season to more than twenty million in 2012/13, approximately 54 percent of the country’s 
cultivatable surface area (SIIA 2017). These transformations, which were accompanied by 
the concentration of production, ownership, and depeasantization, did not limit themselves 
to the core of Argentina’s farming region but rapidly expanded into regions that had 
previously been considered marginal, causing major changes in the sociopolitical, economic, 
and cultural dynamics in these territories. This is certainly true of Chaco Province in the 
north of Argentina, where technological advances such as direct sowing and transgenic seeds 
have made it possible to cultivate land that had previously been outside capital’s reach either 
because of poor soil quality or because of a climate unconducive to production. These 
spaces have now started to be perceived by major producers as valuable areas in which to 
expand the agribusiness frontier.  
This trend was accentuated by the state, which authorized the sale of large swathes of 
state-owned land under often informal and irregular circumstances: in many cases, rural and 
indigenous families did not have definitive deeds to the land on which they lived, and some 
sales amounted to as little as $1.14 per hectare (Zarrilli 2008). Deforestation also intensified 
the trend. A report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) placed 
Argentina among the top ten deforested countries between 1990 and 2015, when forest was 
cleared from 7.6 million ha, approximately 300,000 ha a year. It is important to note that 80 
percent of deforestation was concentrated across four provinces in the north: Santiago del 
Estero, Salta, Formosa, and Chaco. According to the report, the main causes of the loss of 
forests were the expansion of agriculture (transgenic soybeans and intensive livestock 
farming) and fires. Seventeen thousand ha were cleared in 2017, of which 10,718 were 
situated in a protected forest area (Greenpeace 2017). The surface area planted with 
soybeans in Chaco increased from 130,000 ha in 1997/98 to 596,980 in 2014/15 (SIIA 
2017). As we shall observe in the next few sections, the sale of state land, deforestation, and 
changes in production practices following the introduction of new crops also brought drastic 
changes to the lives of indigenous communities. Fencing and the mechanization of new 
facilities also meant the end of the marisca practice (hunter-gatherer activities) as well as a 
considerable reduction in the availability of wage labor. 
In addition to the expansion of agribusiness1 nationally and across the province, re-
forms at the state level took place. In particular, and following the 2001 economic crisis, the 
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Argentinean state—similar to those of many other Latin American countries—began to take 
a much more active role under the successive governments of Presidents Néstor and Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner, shifting away from the policies of the Washington Consensus but 
without altering the mode of accumulation of capital. The neoliberal pro-agribusiness model 
of rural development remained: agribusinesses received more than 80 percent of the 7,359 
million pesos distributed between 2007 and 2010 as subsidies to the agricultural sector 
(Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017:11–12).  
In this new context, however, the state implemented multiple social benefits and rural 
development programs, initially aimed at rural workers and peasants but progressively also 
focused on indigenous communities (VomHau and Wilde 2010). This trend can be observed 
in the guidelines that governed both the Programa de Desarrollo de Áreas Rurales (Rural 
Development Program, PRODEAR) and the Programa de Desarrollo Rural Incluyente (Inclusive 
Rural Development Program, PRODERI) run by the Unidad para el Cambio Rural (Unit for 
Rural Change, UCAR), part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries under 
the Kirchner governments (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, y Pesca 2012). Respectively, 
PRODEAR sought the 1) “promotion and creation of conditions that allow for the 
sustainable development of rural areas as part of the regional economy” 2) “the increase of 
income and improvement of living conditions” and 3) “the sustainable use of natural 
resources and special attention given to indigenous communities,” while PRODERI worked 
to “improve the social and production conditions of rural families with special attention paid 
to indigenous peoples” (UCAR 2018; PRODERI 2018).  
Many of the neoliberal transformations mentioned above, which are not exclusive to 
Argentina, such as the increase in commodity crops, the concentration of production and 
ownership, depeasantization, deforestation, and the privatization of state land, have been 
explained by changes in the form of accumulation of capital at a global level. In more 
specific terms, several authors state that the rise and consolidation of the agribusiness model 
across the world are inextricably linked to the rise of “accumulation by dispossession” as the 
main mechanism for the reproduction of capital (Harvey 2003; see also Araghi 2009; Borras 
et al. 2012; Li 2010; McMichael 2006). To a great extent, these studies have noted the 
importance of accumulation by dispossession in rural areas, its negative effects on 
indigenous and peasant communities, and the increasing resistance exercised against it. 
Less attention has been paid to the new forms of inclusion that emerged during the rise 
of the so-called Pink Tide governments in Latin America, which occurred simultaneously 
with the expansion of the agribusiness model. In general, studies that have analyzed the 
policies implemented by these governments have centered on the debate over the use-
fulness and scope of the concept of “post-neoliberalism.” While some authors believe that 
the first decade of the 21st century in Latin America saw a new pact between the state and 
society that required new concepts, others saw continuities with the neoliberal period—given 
the prominence of the model of extraction and exploitation of raw materials—arguing this 
to be more important than any political changes and that, therefore, a new category was not 
appropriate (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012; Torrado 2016; Wylde 2016; Yates and Bakker 
2013). Within the latter group, some studies have analyzed specific social movements, 
emphasizing the transformative risks of fragmentation and co-option associated with the 
Pink Tide, which limited some movements’ ability to resist (Lapegna 2015; Savino 2016). 
 The way the everyday practices of rural subaltern groups have been affected by the 
interaction between the new forms of inclusion that emerged under the Pink Tide 
governments and the mechanisms of exclusion deriving from the “neo-extractivist”2 model 
as a central pillar of accumulation continue to be underanalyzed. In fact, although they are 
often theorized as distinct and independent process, inclusion and exclusion must be 
described in relation to one another and their interactions remain understudied.3 
The purpose of this article is to shed light on new forms of rural experiences, examining 
the multiple dynamics that have emerged following the transformations undergone in the 
indigenous communities as a result of the primacy of accumulation by dispossession, the role 
assumed by the state during the so-called left turn, and the political (re)actions of subalterns 
in these contexts. 
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Bearing this objective in mind, I have organized this article as follows: in the first 
section, after briefly describing the concept of accumulation by dispossession, I argue that 
although these processes, as Levien (2017) writes, are profoundly political, the exclusive 
focus on extra-economic coercion and confrontations between the state and subalterns 
limits the analysis of rural dynamics. For this reason, in order to obtain a more complete 
understanding of the “new ruralities,” I propose to draw on the analyses of capitalism, the 
state, and subaltern groups presented by Sanyal (2007) and Chatterjee (2004, 2008, 2017). 
Following the lead of these authors I describe the unstable dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion, as state sectors and subaltern groups confront one another within the current of 
tensions between capitalist expansion and democratic governments that base their legitimacy 
on broad-based popular support. In the second section, I introduce the case of the Qom 
communities in Pampa del Indio, Argentina, summarizing some of the major changes that 
have taken place following the introduction of the agribusiness model into the region as well 
as their implications regarding relations between indigenous communities, the state, and 
NGOs.4 The third and final section is dedicated to a brief reflection on the points raised 
previously. 
 
Accumulation by Dispossession as a Political Process 
 
In recent years, critical rural studies have been strongly influenced by the concept of “ac-
cumulation by dispossession” (AbD). This concept, developed by Harvey, is a reformulation 
of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation, which refers to the separation of people from 
their ways of life and production, as well as the way in which preexisting social and cultural 
structures were co-opted, confronted, and repressed to serve the needs of capital.  
According to Harvey, far from being limited to a single stage of history, this form of 
accumulation has been present throughout the history of capitalism and has become 
fundamentally important in the neoliberal era as a mechanism for overcoming the crisis of 
overaccumulation (Harvey 2003, 2007). Harvey has expanded the concept of primitive ac-
cumulation to include a wide range of contemporary processes: “These include the com-
modification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the 
conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into 
exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of 
labor power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and 
consumption; colonial, neocolonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets 
(including natural resources); monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the 
slave trade [which continues particularly in the sex industry]; and usury, the national debt and 
ultimately the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation. The State, with its 
monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and 
promoting these processes” (Harvey 2003:145). The versatility of the concept of AbD, as it 
encompasses a wide range of instances of contemporary dispossession and can draw a link 
between global and local processes, explains why it became so important to contemporary 
rural studies (Hart 2006; Levien 2013).  
However, as Levien has noted (2011; 2013; 2017), the concept presents certain 
limitations deriving from Harvey’s identification of the overaccumulation of capital as the 
driving force of the process. In this sense, the original formulation of AbD overlooks how it 
is an eminently political process whose results cannot be determined solely by the 
imperatives of capital. These results also depend on the unstable struggles and compromises 
between subaltern and dominant groups in specific contexts (Levien 2017; see also Biocca 
2016).  
Although Levien (2017) has made an important contribution in noting that processes of 
AbD are political processes of redistribution mediated by the state, his analysis confines the 
relationship between the state and subalterns to a social relationship of forced redistribution. 
He states that since dispossession occurs just once for subalterns and dominant groups, class 
compromise and the conformity of subaltern groups are not very likely: “Whereas the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations requires an ongoing form of submission, 
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dispossession requires very short-term (though typically irreversible) acquiescence. As a 
singular and discrete process dispossession does not require (and may not be able to 
produce) sustained domination” (Levien 2013:20).  
The problem with this argument is the underlying idea that during the neoliberal period, 
when AbD came to the fore, the role of the state and its relationship with subaltern sectors 
remained unchanged. Paradoxically, Levien’s analysis reproduces the perspective of the 
neoliberal state that has tended to hold sway in critical agrarian studies—in which it is 
described as a homogenous entity with certain unchanging characteristics—in opposition to 
a similarly uniform group of resisting subalterns. In these readings, the role of the state in 
processes of AbD is, on one hand, to offer concessions and benefits to attract capital and, 
on the other hand, to resort to violence in confronting increased resistance from displaced 
peoples (Baneerjee-Guha 2008).  
Similarly, there is a tendency in these studies to believe that subaltern groups are always 
resolved to oppose the changes implemented by the state. In studies focused on the 
experience of indigenous communities, there is also an assumption that the ideological 
concerns about the “indigenous way of life” are the main driving force in rural struggles. 
Within this analysis, this way of life is implicitly conceived as being anticapitalist, antistate, 
anticolonial, and closely linked to food sovereignty (Kay 2015). These assumptions about 
subalterns, present in the vast majority of the literature, has been very well described by 
Chandra as the construction of “a Universal Resisting Subject,” which the author describes 
as very frequently reflecting our desire to transcend capitalism and seek alternatives rather 
than a real subject (Chandra 2016). 
This simplification of the role of the state, as well as the homogenization of the 
subaltern groups, overlooks the subtle differences between different periods of neoliberalism 
and the different relationships the state establishes with different subaltern groups within a 
single period (Brent 2015). This is why rural communities where dispossession is taking place 
have been analyzed as areas of conflict, but these analyses have not progressed to examine 
the everyday politics that result from this situation. Viewing AbD as an inherently political 
process also means considering not only the conflict between the state and subalterns but 
also the many different compromises and relationships that it generates. 
 
Relationships between the State and Subaltern Groups in the Context of AbD  
While in its original formulation as primitive accumulation capitalism involved the 
conversion of displaced people into wage workers, contemporary processes have proved the 
capitalist system incapable of absorbing these populations. As Sanyal says, “They are 
condemned to the world of the excluded, the redundant, the dispensable, having nothing to 
lose, not even the chains of wage-slavery” (2007:53). This incomplete path of agrarian 
transition is a fundamental aspect of contemporary processes (AlShehabi and Suroor 2016; 
Araghi 2009; Li 2011). As Chatterjee and Sanyal have noted, even if the dispossession is a 
singular and discrete process, at present it is not possible to create or facilitate the necessary 
conditions for this hoarding and dispossession to occur if programs are not simultaneously 
implemented to satisfy the basic needs of displaced populations. This is partly because, in 
contrast to the stages prior to capitalist development, globally prevailing normative ideas 
prevent the state from entirely abandoning these people to their fate or meeting the demands 
of these groups with force. To be more precise, Chatterjee and Sanyal write that since the 
1980s, there has been a generalized consensus over the main governmental function, 
establishing that it should focus on the well-being and protection of the population. If the 
state does not manage to provide these two things, its legitimacy is at risk. In other words, 
“Capital is economically self-subsistent. It does not need this surplus population. However, 
capital is not politically or ideologically self-subsistent, because it is forced to address this 
outside politically and ideologically” (Chatterjee and Sanyal 2016:104). 
AbD thus requires violence, which is constitutive of capitalist relationships, being 
attenuated—not ended—by institutions, regulations, and everyday practices. Although this 
clearly does not mean that the demands of the displaced will be given weight equal to those 
of more powerful actors, Chatterjee believes the notion that the entire population is equal 
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under the law and the state to be nothing but a fiction. Thus arises the dual role that must be 
played by the state, leading to a division between what Chatterjee calls “civil” and “political” 
society. The former, where he places the dominant sectors and middle classes, is the domain 
of the capitalist economy5 and the citizenry. The latter contains poor rural sectors in the 
realm of the need-based economy and governmentality (Chatterjee 2008:57). In this “political 
society” or “wasteland of the dispossessed,” these groups, whose exclusion is permanent, are 
“rehabilitated” through noncapitalist activities6 supplied by the state or other actors, such as 
NGOs. The objective of these interventions is to develop instruments to meet the socially 
acceptable level of consumption and standards of living for excluded sectors. In other 
words, programs of conditional monetary transfers, the provision of subsidies, the supply of 
merchandise and supplies, etc., are the political responses required by contemporary 
processes of AbD. It is important to note that insofar as capital is always looking to expand, 
these need-based economies are, in turn, at constant risk of being destroyed; thus, they are 
highly unstable—so much so that those excluded must be continuously involved in 
resistance and negotiation to ensure the reproduction of their current situation. In contrast 
to classic, more stable welfare models, ongoing processes of creation and destruction of 
protective programs are currently prevalent (Chatterjee and Sanyal 2016).  
It is important to make clear that neither the state nor political society is a homogenous 
entity. Political society contains within it multiple realities composed of diverse groups, each 
of which has different characteristics and thus different demands. Therefore, each group 
constructs different relationships and negotiates differently with the state. Chatterjee further 
notes that not all groups in political society manage to achieve their demands. To a large 
extent, their success or failure will depend on how organized they are, i.e., whether they are 
recognized as a single group that can and should receive the benefits of a specific 
governmental program, their capacity to mobilize at a local level, the existing distribution of 
power in society overall, the skill of their leaders or mediators, and, especially, the strategic 
balance of different forces in a given time and place (Chatterjee 2004:126–57).  
In addition, changing political forces within a state also result in the granting of different 
levels and periods of greater or lesser protection to different groups. This is very important 
for understanding different periods within the neoliberal state and in analyzing in the case of 
Latin America, and not only the change that came with the Pink Tide governments but also 
the recent shift to the right. That said, one must highlight that placing an emphasis on the 
complexity of the state’s role under AbD should not lead us to think that it is the only 
determining factor in how these processes develop. Although the state has historically 
affected and redefined the experience of subaltern groups in profound ways, the agency and 
struggle of these groups have also redefined the policies of states. Here, it is important to 
note that although the demands of subaltern sectors in these contexts are often initially 
specific and remain within the boundaries of conventional politics, they manage to draw 
responses from the state and sometimes result in gradual change. In addition, on certain 
occasions, the demands may expand into a more comprehensive platform that questions 
conventional policies or even the model of accumulation itself (Chatterjee 2017).  
 
Pampa del Indio and Rural Life under Dispossession 
 
My case study focuses on the region of Pampa del Indio—one of the most populous 
indigenous enclaves in Argentina—located in the far north of the General San Martín 
Department, Chaco Province. Between 2007 and 2015, representatives of the Frente para la 
Victoria, the political group founded by Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, governed both the 
province and the local area of Pampa del Indio.7  
The settlement of Pampa del Indio covers an area of 1750 square kilometers (km) and, 
according to the 2001 Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas, has a population of 
11,558 inhabitants, of whom over 50 percent identify as Qom. In terms of spatial 
distribution, most of the nonindigenous rural criollo population lives in the urban center 
while the majority of Qom families live in outlying regions, mostly in what are known as  
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parajes (such as Pampa Chica, Campo Medina Campo Nuevo, Lote 4, and Campo Cacique). 
Criollo refers to a person of mixed racial background, generally of European ancestry. The 
distance between the paraje settlements and the urban center ranges between 3 km and 45 
km. 
Historically, the Qom communities inhabiting the area were organized in groups of bi-
lateral kindred, or bandas, consisting of two or more extended families.8 These units were 
nomadic hunter-gatherers within a defined territory. The different Qom groups circled 
through their territories that lay on both banks of the Bermejo River (Miller 1979). At certain 
times of the year, when forest fruits had ripened, the different bands would meet to 
consolidate leadership, exchange products, hold marriages, seal agreements, or carry out 
certain rituals (Miller 1979; Wright 2008). 
When the national army occupied the right-hand shore of the Bermejo River in 1884, 
the Qom settled on the left-hand side and stayed there until the early decades of the 20th 
century when the policy of the Argentine state began to focus on the incorporation of this 
population into the labor force rather than on its extermination. It was then that the fami-
lies led by Cacique Taigoyic may have moved south, settling in a location close to their 
present one (Fernández and Braunstein 2001).  
These Qom families provided most of the workforce at the Las Palmas refinery and 
sawmills. The Irish brothers Charles and Richard Hardy founded the Las Palmas sugar mill 
in 1882. In those years, the Hardys requested the concession of 100,000 ha for the 
production of sugarcane. Given the importance of the refinery to the economy of the re-
gion and the increased need for labor, evidence exists testifying to policies encouraging 
permanent settlement of indigenous groups by the government of the national territory of 
Chaco (Cordeu and Siffredi 1971; Miller 1979). Oral testimonies collected in 2012 affirmed 
that President Yrigoyen granted Cacique Taigoyic, who was also known for his role as a 
contractor for the Las Palmas, a temporary occupation permit for what informants esti-
mated to be forty square leagues for his tribe (interviews with Qom inhabitants of Pampa del 
Indio, 2012). 
Figure 1. Map of Pampa del Indio, Chaco Province, Argentina (Map by Author).  
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Decades later, due to the successive economic crises suffered by the refinery and the 
modification of the law of colonization, some of the land granted to the indigenous people 
was withdrawn and given to new settlers arriving in the region to promote cotton 
production. “When Taigoyic died, people came from all over, from I don’t know where, 
strange people looking for land,” remembered Mariana, a Qom assistant teacher who works 
at the bilingual intercultural center (described below) in a 2010 interview. A note sent by the 
governor of Chaco to the chief of police in 1932 also documents memory of criollo 
incursions into Qom territory and the problems deriving from precarious tenancy. In this 
note, the governor recognizes the following:  
 
Although the lands of “Pampa del Indio” have been measured, the land 
office has not granted ownership as yet. Cacique Bautista García has 
presented a complaint to this Office stating that colonizers are continually 
entering the lands they occupy and are established in, fencing off land to 
which they thus far have had a recognized temporary right (Silva 1994). 
 
This dispossession of the Qom was partially reversed in the mid-1940s, when the 
nation-state introduced certain redistribution policies, including the expropriation of large 
and midsize criollo landowners’ holdings. With these and other measures that benefitted 
small producers and rural workers, the new government of President Juan D. Perón sought 
to challenge the power of large landowners in an attempt to expand the basis of his 
administration’s legitimacy. In this context, several indigenous communities acquired rights 
of occupation or ownership of lands and received different kinds of benefits from the 
government to encourage agricultural production. It was during these years that several Qom 
families received provisional deeds to individual 25 or 50 ha lots. 
Community histories report that Cacique Pedro Martínez negotiated with President 
Perón to obtain the land where the settlements of Campo Medina and Pampa Chica arose. 
Access to parcels of land and supplies for production continued to be provided during 
the Peronist decade. These were also channeled through churches and NGOs (both religious 
and secular) that received funds from overseas (Bray 1989:16). Towards the end of the 
1970s, the Misión Evangélica Bautista (Evangelical Baptist Mission) granted 704 ha to a legal 
 
Figure 2. Satellite view of Pampa del Indio (Biocca 2015). 
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Figure 3. Cotton spinning plant in Pampa del Indio, 2012 (Photo by Author). 
 
entity representing Qom families, giving rise to the current settlement of Campo Nuevo. 
During those years, most of the Qom families were contracted to clean and harvest the fields 
of criollo farms. In addition, many of them produced their own cotton, which they sold 
through the Cooperativa Pampa del Indio, founded in 1975. However, despite the granting 
of these lots, the total amount of land designated to the community did not reach the 
approximately 100,000 ha (the same as the 40 leagues granted by Cacique Taigoyic) 
previously granted in 1922 by Yrigoyen.9 Moreover, the progressive growth of the 
population meant that the lots became increasingly insufficient and reinforced the Qom’s 
dependence on wage labor in the criollo camps and what they could still obtain from 
marisca. 
In the late 1980s, when the cotton period was coming to an end, the rural population of 
Pampa del Indio plunged into a profound crisis. The fall in the price of cotton meant that 
many farmers were unable to make payments on their debts and thus decided to sell the 
land. This situation exacerbated the unemployment crisis and contributed to increased 
migration into town and other cities. 
Simultaneously, following the return of democracy in December of 1983, after more 
than six years of bloody rule under military dictatorship, the state began to encourage the 
creation of community associations as a way of channeling indigenous peoples’ demands. To 
be recognized as beneficiaries of specific rights, indigenous communities had to adopt the 
administrative structure of a civil association and choose representatives by a simple majority 
vote each year. Thus arose the first indigenous organizations in Pampa del Indio: the 
Asociación Comunitaria Cacique Pedro Martínez, the Asociación Comunitaria Campo Medina, the 
Asociación Comunitaria Cacique Taigoyic and the Comisión Zonal de Tierras. For a long period of 
time, the activities of the last two organizations focused almost exclusively on facilitating the 
provision of definitive titles to land and contributing to efforts to prevent the sale of 
aboriginal land. A decade later, during the 2001 economic crisis, a major new organization 
appeared, the Unión Campesina (UC). The UC started to place more emphasis on production 
issues and started to hold marches and block roads, campaigning for the immediate delivery 
of seeds and tools for both self-consumption and cotton production. Currently, the UC 
together with the Asociación Comunitaria Cacique Taigoyic and the Comisión Zonal de Tierras 
comprise the leading indigenous organizations in the area.10 However, their leaders are not 
the only representatives. The proliferation of evangelical churches, the emergence of the 
Instituto del Aborigen Chaqueño (Aborigine Institute of Chaco [IDACH]),11 and the subsequent 
rise of higher-education courses as a route to leadership credentials have expanded the 
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spaces of power within communities where different types of leadership currently co-exist. 
The 1990s saw a worsening of the economic crisis and an increase in unemployment 
linked to the disappearance of cotton production largely caused by a reduction in state 
subsidies. 
 
The Conflict with Don Panos 
In 1996, a profound transformation began in Pampa del Indio. In that year, a business 
group, Unitec Agro S.A., bought large tracts of land, some state-owned and others be-
longing to cotton producers in the region. According to several Qom residents, these lands 
were part of the original area given to Taigoyic in 1922. On these lands, the Unitec Agro S.A. 
group founded the Don Panos establishment, which occupies a 120,000 ha area between the 
provinces of Chaco and Formosa on both sides of the Bermejo River. Of this parcel, 
approximately 53,000 are in Chaco and border the rural settlements of Campo Medina, 
Pampa Chica, and Campo Nuevo. 
Initially, in a context of deep recession, many inhabitants of Pampa del Indio were 
hopeful about the arrival of a large company. For the great majority of Qom residents, the 
company represented the prospect of employment: “It was good, we had work, and they 
were going to pay us every fifteen days,” remembered Luis, who took part in the first land 
clearing work. The expectation of receiving a salary that would ensure a living was 
temporarily satisfied as several members of the community were hired to carry out clearance 
work, although it was not always performed in accordance with the law. While the Forestry 
Department provided authorization to clear 1000 ha, the company cleared more than 1600 
ha. Following this infraction, the Forestry Department fined the company. Undeterred, 
Unitec Agro S.A. would violate regulations once again a few months later by clearing 2500 
ha without receiving official authorization (Greenpeace 2006). Some informants claim that 
the company did not even pay the fine for either violation. 
Unitec Agro S.A. also employed temporary labor to construct a landing strip for large 
aircraft, a hangar, and an aqueduct connecting the company’s facilities with the Bermejo 
River. The latter construction’s purpose was to feed the modern irrigation system required 
by soybean cultivation in the area. 
However, in a short period of time, numerous labor and environmental conflicts began 
to arise in Pampa del Indio. As the production of Don Panos was mechanized to a 
significant degree and the marisca practice was prevented in the area by a perimeter fence 
and security staff hired by the company, Qom families became far more vulnerable. As 
Carlos, a Qom man of approximately fifty who was until recently a member of the Unión 
Campesina explains, 
 
When it wasn’t fenced off, that land was a part of the territory of the 
indigenous people. Our cemetery was in the middle of the land, about 15 
km in. When the landowners came, they closed everything off, and we 
couldn’t even cross to the other side. The government does business with 
the landowners who buy the things (land), and we, because we’re poor, 
can’t do anything, the community’s territory gets smaller and smaller (2016). 
 
In addition, many residents in Campo Medina suffered health problems and lost their 
crops due to the company’s crop-spraying regime. For this reason, some community 
members initiated a lawsuit in 2006 demanding that fumigations by the company cease. 
Despite the gathered evidence, the complaint was rejected, and the conflicts continued. Two 
years later, during what was known as “the conflict with the countryside,”12 the 
confrontation between the Qom communities in Pampa del Indio and the company 
intensified, becoming most visible in 2010, when the story was covered in the national 
newspaper Pagina 12. 
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Figure 4. Dona Panos Establishment, 2012      Figure 5. Dona Panos Establishment 2016 
(Photo by Author).                                            (Photo by Author). 
 
However, hoarding and displacement were not the only processes occurring in Pampa 
del Indio during these years. Simultaneously, different government programs of rural 
development and social benefits were introduced. In addition to the rural development 
programs mentioned at the beginning of this text, in 2009, almost every family in the 
community began to receive the Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social (Child 
Support for Vulnerable Families [AUH]). The AUH is a monthly sum given to children13 of 
the unemployed and those working in the informal economy with incomes equal to or less 
than the minimum wage. From May 2011, the benefit was extended to women pregnant for 
three months or longer as part of Plan Nacer. According to a report by the OIT, UNICEF, 
and Flacso-Argentina, “Access to the AUH by this sector of society—indigenous 
communities—is considered to be a notable improvement in income that leads to changes in 
patterns of consumption, improved nutrition, improved health and the possibility to carry 
out production activities and improve living conditions” (OIT, UNICEF, and Flacso 
2013:7). An example of the changes that the new income brought was the proliferation of 
small-engine motorcycles and mobile phones, which were very important in improving and 
facilitating communication between remote rural settlements. 
Furthermore, during these years, Pampa del Indio underwent important infrastructure 
improvements. On my first visit in 2010, not many of the streets in the town were paved; in 
2016, almost the entire urban area had been covered. During this period of time, paving 
work was also performed on Ruta 3 (financed by a World Bank project) and Ruta 4 
(financed by the Vialidad Nacional program). 
The changes in infrastructure in the area included works related to the provision of 
water to the town and rural settlements. In 2013, the Unitec Agro S.A. Servicio de Agua y 
Mantenimiento Empresa del Estado Provincial (SAMEEP) aqueduct was opened. This 
work, jointly financed by the company through its corporate responsibility program and the 
provincial government, involved the creation of a water reservoir on company land fed by 
the aqueduct from the Bermejo River and the installation of 23 km of pipes that connected 
this reservoir to a water treatment plant in Pampa del Indio. In the following years, work on 
the aqueduct connecting Presidencia Roca to Pampa del Indio progressed, and feeders to 
supply other rural settlements between both locations were built. 
All this meant major changes for the town. Between 2010 and 2016, a new building for 
the municipality and its council was built, the Casa de las Culturas, including a hall for 
cinema and theater, was opened, and the central plaza was refurbished. The bank Nuevo 
Banco del Chaco was expanded and now has three ATMs, two more than before. Finally, 
many new houses were built, most of them financed by the Provincial Institute for Urban 
Development and Housing (IPDUV). For the rural settlements, one of the most important 
installations was the Bilingual Intercultural Complex Lqataxac Nam Qompi. This educa-
tional complex, opened in August 2012, houses Agricultural Family School No. 185, free 
adult secondary education, a tertiary education institute, and three diploma courses in in-
digenous social administration. Improvements to housing and electrification works were also 
carried out as part of the Program of Provincial Agrarian Services (PROSAP). 
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Figure 6. Pampa del Indio, 2012 (Photo by Figure 7. Pampa de Indio entrance with new 
Author). paved road, 2016 (Photo by Author). 
  
 
 
Figure 8. Water infrastructure project, 2016 (Photo by Author). 
 
 
Figure 9. Rural electrification project, 2016 (Photo by Author). 
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Figure 10. Casa de las Culturas, 2016 (Photo by Author). 
 
 
Figure 11. The Bilingual Intercultural Complex Lqataxac Nam Qompi, 2016 (Photo by 
Author). 
 
What was the relationship between these processes of dispossession and protection? 
What new dynamics emerged in this context? What kinds of rurality were the indigenous 
people of Pampa del Indio actually experiencing? These, as stated above, were the questions 
that guided my last fieldwork, which I describe below. 
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The Politics of Accumulation by Dispossession, or How the “Aid” Began to Change 
Witnessing the major changes taking place in Pampa del Indio, one of the aspects that most 
attracted my attention was related to the notion of “aid.” Despite all the transformations, 
which could be observed by anyone visiting the town, almost all the Qom agreed that, for 
approximately two decades, it had been difficult to obtain “aid.” Francisco, a seventy-four-
year-old resident of Campo Medina, said: 
 
In ’58, when we left Misión Laishí and came to Pampa del Indio, the De-
partment of the Aborigine gave us aid. Fencing, plows, hammers, anvils, 
tongs, all the tools we needed to work. Some people even got cows. That 
year, the people got to work planting cotton, potatoes, there was a lot of 
aid. The Department of the Aborigine had sway with the government. And 
when there wasn’t enough to eat, we could mariscar. At the time, the forests 
were untouched, the trees were bigger, we got honey. It wasn’t like today, 
when there’s almost no aid. In ‘97/’98, aid from the government ended. 
Then, we couldn’t do any production work because there wasn’t any. You 
can’t work without aid, you can’t do the work, and you have to go out and 
look for it. We need to get projects, now people have the legal personhood 
number, but there’s no one to aid us (2016). 
 
However, on many other occasions, when talking about the main changes that they had 
noticed in the area, the majority of the Qom interviewed said that, at present, one does not 
observe as much poverty as before because there was “more aid” from the government. For 
instance, one morning, Desiderio, a Qom of approximately forty-five years of age (and a 
member of the Zonal Land Commission (CZT), told his story, saying: 
 
My story is similar to that of all poor people. Previously, the story was very 
sad because we didn’t know what biscuits were or anything. The 
community was neglected. After 2000 was when they started to appear, that 
was when we started to receive head of household benefits. The thing is 
that, now, in the communities, there are benefits, and they can help the 
children. If you have a family, you have enough to keep them clothed and 
to buy a few things they didn’t have before, like motorcycles. Before, it 
wasn’t like that, we were suffering, but now, things have changed a little. 
They give help, and you can feed your children and buy clothes for school. 
Some people can buy supplies for school, some people can buy a freezer, 
for example, they can live, more or less (2016). 
 
The tension surrounding the term “aid” is, I believe, a clear reflection of the change that 
occurred in state interventions following the predominance of processes of AbD. In contrast 
to the policies implemented on both large and small scales between the 1940s and 1980s, 
which were aimed at encouraging production as well as ensuring labor in cotton 
establishments, currently the objective is to ensure the survival of these families via the 
market. In other words, the new aid allows for the monetary purchase of resources in town 
but not the participation of these groups as rural producers or workers, given that they are 
no longer necessary for the accumulation of capital. For this reason, their exclusion, far from 
being temporary or fluctuating, is permanent. This is not the expansion of what Marx might 
call the “reserve army;” under the current form of accumulation, and from the point of view 
of capital, these excluded men and women fulfill no function at all. 
In addition, while past programs were mostly aimed at associations, during the period 
analyzed here they were mainly aimed at family units. Thus, as Francisco says, although it 
took several years of bureaucratic procedures, currently almost every group has fulfilled the 
requirement of forming community associations with legal person status. But now, state 
resources are not necessarily channeled through them. The change in recipient also meant 
changes in the sums given, which has led to multiple effects, including a weakening of the 
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associations and growing differentiation within the community. Where before tractors could 
be bought for communal use, current income is only sufficient for certain nonproductive 
goods such as cellphones, motorbikes and basic foodstuffs. The programs that were 
channeled through associations and indigenous organizations were usually aimed at public 
lighting, housing, and the installation of windmills or water pumps.  
As the state, in seeking to maintain its social and political legitimacy, has incorporated 
these groups into circuits of nonproductive capital, links with the market have actually 
grown stronger, not weaker. This partially explains why certain goods that families used to 
produce must now be bought in town. This growing financialization, against a backdrop of 
exclusion from the means of production and employment, has increased uncertainty among 
community members; the absence of a policy guaranteeing that the sums received will keep 
pace with the high inflation rates that are common in Argentina reinforces this trend. The 
respective words of Simón, Georgina, and Sergio, residents of Campo Medina, the first two 
being members of the UC and the latter a member of the Asociación Cacique Taigoyic, 
which I quote below, show how the “aid” has accentuated the vulnerability of these groups: 
 
What we’re studying now is the social aid; we’re not against it, but the 
government also has an obligation to do something at home so we can at 
least plant manioc, sweet potatoes, something else. Also, it’s not enough: 
the electricity bill takes up at least half the social aid, that’s the reality (2016). 
 
This year, we don’t have a project yet; if we’re lucky with one, we’ll get 
something for housing, that’s what I’m hearing, but nothing for production, 
and in Campo Medina, people need that. Because, look, people get the 
pension, but goods are very expensive, and a mother can’t buy clothes, 
shoes, food for her children because it’s not enough (2016). 
 
I want to have a vegetable garden again, but you can’t get the seeds. I ask 
myself why I should have to buy squash and mandioca when we have land? 
I start thinking why I should have to buy squash in town for $8 or $10 per 
kilo? My neighbor went into town the other day to get me mandioca, which 
costs $12, but he charged me $20. What else can you do? You have to buy 
(2016). 
 
It must also be noted that contemporary interventions are generally described as being 
“exceptional,” which implies a greater degree of instability compared to state policies in the 
past. As Chatterjee indicates, “Those in political society make their claims on government, 
and in turn are governed, not within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights 
and laws, but rather through temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements arrived at 
through direct political negotiations” (Chatterjee 2008:57).  
This instability can be clearly observed, for example, when there is a change in 
government, and subaltern groups are unsure whether the benefits obtained will be 
maintained or not. Desiderio, whom I interviewed after the presidential elections in 2015, 
said: 
 
Now that we have benefits that support us, it seems a shame because 
there’s a new government that is talking about cutting the support. If we 
lose these benefits, we will start to suffer as we did before. We don’t have 
anything anymore; this is what supports us now (2016). 
 
The period between elections and the change in government also accentuates the in-
stability not only due to a lack of certainty over the continuity of benefits but also because it 
creates an interregnum period where unfinished projects and/or those that are about to be 
presented are left in limbo. Sergio commented on this: 
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The women presented a note to an institution, but now, it’s a little 
complicated because of the renewal issue. Right now, it’s impossible to 
present a project, not until the middle of this year at least. “Zero poverty” 
[a key slogan in Mauricio Macri’s campaign], the new president said, there 
won’t be any more poverty, either they’ll kill all the poor or help them, I 
don’t know, I don’t know what this [the change in government] means 
(2016). 
 
However, instability is not limited to electoral changes; many of those interviewed stated 
that the lack of information is a main reason why they do not have access to development 
programs and social benefits. Talking about her income, Elizabeth, a member of the group 
Madres Cuidadoras de la Cultura Qom, said: 
 
All I get is the AUH, but it doesn’t stretch very far. My husband is 
unemployed, but he doesn’t collect anything. We hear on the television and 
the radio that there’s help for the unemployed, but we don’t know how to 
get it. I don’t know what to do, where to go (2016). 
 
Meanwhile, Higinio, a Qom man of approximately forty, said: 
 
I think there’s a lack of information, they’re keeping information to them-
selves. There are things we have no idea about. We’re talking about the is-
sue of housing, help, all that. Here, they told me that they assigned a mil-
lion and a half to housing and improvements in living conditions, but so 
far, we haven’t heard anything about it. We don’t know if the mayor has 
received the money or where it went. I think that it suits the government 
when you block the road and they build one house. There’s no political 
relationship with the community (2016). 
 
In other cases, the instability refers to how the resources are distributed and at whose 
discretion. On this subject, several residents of Pampa del Indio mentioned that in the 
majority of cases the relationships and the projects that they managed to obtain through 
state institutions generally depend on the personal contacts that they are able to establish. In 
a meeting I had with members of three organizations, Simón said that, for example, the 
Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (National Institute of Agricultural 
Technology [INTA])14 had worked with the CZT, but only because one of its leaders knew 
the technicians. 
 
When the time came to plant the vegetable garden, the people at the INTA 
suggested we come to get seeds. But they just spoke with some of the 
leaders. When we were in the assembly, the INTA never came to suggest 
that, only when they meet someone. Because they know someone. Because 
their paths cross, just like that, because they talk to you in the village. But 
there are days when we have meetings, assemblies in Campo Medina, and 
they never come to propose that. They come saying that people don’t like 
the idea of planting, but the thing is, it’s hard to get seeds. I think that 
everyone would like to have a vegetable garden, I think that would be 
important because you go to the cooperative, and you ask for a can of 
watermelon seeds, and I think it was $500, and now, it must be more. And 
all the achievements are the result of struggle, there are agreements with the 
government, but they’re never fulfilled. The government never resolves 
things of its own accord, it always happens through struggle. And what we 
always do is block the road. It’s the only way to get them to listen to you 
(2016). 
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Simón’s and Higinio’s accounts also highlight another aspect that characterizes the new 
rural experiences of the dispossessed in the context of AbD: the struggle over channels 
through which groups can voice their demands, thus affecting how they are governed. That 
all of this is not settled in advance serves to alert us that the relative importance of social 
programs ultimately depends on shifting relations of force. In other words, social programs 
are not only top-down decisions by elites but also the result of persistent struggles from 
below as manifested in numerous road blockades. Below, I address this point in greater 
depth. 
 
Channels of Dialogue between the State and the Excluded 
In parallel to the expansion of the agribusiness model, marches and roadblocks have become 
the primary forms of protest and demand in Pampa del Indio, as in many other parts of the 
country. Route 3, where the Qom generally hold their demonstrations, is one of the few 
places in Pampa del Indio where the state, through its security and police forces, has a 
presence. This is perhaps the reason why it has become the main location where subalterns 
make their demands to the state (Bayat 2000). These activities have been strongly criticized 
by what Chatterjee calls “civil society groups,” and many of the interviewees are aware that 
their actions could be considered as being contrary to what is “socially acceptable” and even 
illegal; however, they make it clear that their actions are the only way to campaign for their 
rights. Below, Carlos explains this aspect of the “politics of the excluded”: 
 
In 2002, comrade Mártires had to organize families in search of the aid they 
needed to produce. So, they organized, we had to hold a march to ask the 
government for what we needed. Then, in 2005, after a lot of struggle, we 
were able to receive fuel from the provincial government. In 2006, 2007, 
2008, we got a national subsidy, but after the struggle, we started to work 
with all the communities in the area, in the countryside. From 2009 
onwards, in 2010–2011, we had a mobilization to ask for more aid because 
the need got worse and worse because we didn’t have the necessary aid to 
support families. In 2011, in Castelli, an agreement was signed that we’re 
still fighting for, which was the production plan. It’s a document. The 
production plan would be fuel and tools so that families can work. But with 
the politics, the change of government, now, this year we can have a 
conversation with the government, fighting it, so we can get back to work 
on our farms. The government says yes to everything, but then, it delays a 
lot, so we have to organize a march so that the government gives us what 
we ask for. It’s not just the production issue, it’s water, housing, healthcare. 
And it’s always like that with petitions, and they never recognize your rights, 
you have to go out onto the road to get them to listen to you, and they 
always treat us like that (2016). 
 
In a similar vein, Georgina and Desiderio said, respectively: 
 
In 2002, when Mártires was here, we got a lot of aid, but these weren’t gifts 
from the government. We got those things through struggle, always 
campaigning for our rights. While we fought for our rights on the issues of 
water, housing, health and education, justice was done. As I said, ‘We 
always campaigned for our rights, we didn’t go out looking for a fight; we 
were campaigning for our rights (2016). 
 
The community, every community, because we sometimes want to 
campaign for the things that we have a right to and, sometimes, the 
authorities don’t listen. That is what we’re experiencing now. Sometimes, 
the authorities promise something, say that they’ll help on such and such a 
day, the day comes, and they don’t come through. The only way for us is to 
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block the road or protest at the side of the road. If we don’t do that, they 
ignore us (2016). 
 
Clearly, even when the claims can be framed as rights, for example, the right to housing, 
education, and work, the state treats these groups not as citizens but as groups of people for 
whom different mechanisms are implemented to see to their well-being (Chatterjee 2004:40). 
Rights, as Georgina and Desiderio state above, are mediated by the “help”: recognition does 
not necessarily imply implementation. For this reason, the response is always unstable and 
must be continuously negotiated. Note that my case possesses a major difference from that 
analyzed by Auyero (2011) in his study of the relationships between poor urban sectors and 
the Argentine state. In the latter case analyzed by Auyero, who focused on the interactions 
that occurred in the main welfare of the city of Buenos Aires, access to “help” required the 
acquiescence of the future beneficiaries; in the case studied here, access to “help” can be 
gained through more confrontational acts. In this context, a roadblock is a distinctive form 
of resistance or negotiation. It hinders agribusiness in a specific way, as it reduces the 
circulation of end or intermediary products. The blocking of circulation is thus not only a 
means of attracting the state’s attention but also a specific way of questioning the viability of 
the model itself.15 
The unstable nature of these responses is also reflected in the arbitrary nature of the 
state’s decisions to accept or deny this form of dialogue depending on the present political 
situation, the balance of power within the state, and the risk involved in acceding to the 
demands and making changes to the reigning model called for by subalterns. Therefore, 
while roadblocks led to the distribution of subsidies and tools between 2006 and 2012, they 
were repressed in subsequent years. By the middle of the decade, many leaders were involved 
in civil and penal cases begun against them for carrying out these actions in 2014.16 As Nora, 
currently a councilor and the widow of the former leader of the UC, says: 
 
There’s a case against me that the politicians set up, but I wasn’t doing 
anything, I was just fighting for my rights, I’m a mother with 10 children, 
we always have to fight for our rights, but sometimes, they repress us 
(2016). 
 
Meanwhile, the state is continuously reminding these groups that they are subordinate to 
the hegemonic weighing of rights. As Marx observed, “Between equal rights, force decides” 
(1977 [1867]:344). 
 
Changes in Relationships within the Excluded Groups 
The consolidation of these forms of negotiation between indigenous organizations and the 
state has also caused changes within these communities. As noted by Fisher in his analysis of 
indigenous peoples’ circumstances in the Brazilian Amazon, neoliberalism has generated a 
territorial reorganization under which different enclaves of indigenous populations have 
been established that are highly unstable and extremely dependent on monetary transfers and 
social benefits from the state as well as NGO projects. According to Fisher, life in these 
territories “is frequently crisis-ridden and both leaders and ordinary people are often forced 
to make pressure-filled decisions or to travel to regional centers or cities to search for 
resources, expertise or the enforcement capacity to deal with breakdowns in government 
sponsored institutions” (Fisher 2015:225). 
In this way, insofar as the results depend on the different leaders’ negotiating skills as 
well as the organizations’ ability to pressure the authorities, divisions and conflicts have 
proliferated in Pampa del Indio in recent years. As Esteban, a CZT member, said: 
 
We’re working independently; we’re working directly with the government. 
You know why? We’re not the same as leaders. The government sometimes 
doesn’t agree with the Unión Campesina, and so, members of our 
association think that they’re losing out on days of work, on doing 
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something at home, if we stay with the Unión Campesina. So, they stated 
[decided] that we have to work by our own means. We know that the 
politics have changed, you have to understand, to know how to work with 
politics (2016). 
 
In addition, the new forms of dialogue have weakened the power of local delegates of 
the government-sponsored IDACH, who were very important in the 1990s compared to the 
leaders of indigenous organizations (UC, Asociación Comunitaria Cacique Taigoyic and the 
Comisión Zonal de Tierras) Alfonso, an employee from the Pampa del Indio delegation, said the 
following: 
 
The organizations go straight to the government to block the road, and 
when they get something, it’s given to the organizations; it doesn’t go 
through the IDACH. They have legal person status, they can request aid 
from the province, the nation, and other institutions and nations, from 
anyone who can aid. On the housing issue, for example, we have the 
requirements, the forms, but when they take them, the folders come and go 
elsewhere. It didn’t need to go through the IDACH offices. We were, for 
example, in a struggle to make water free for indigenous people, so they 
came here and said, well, we need a Toba certificate [i.e. proof of Toba 
ethnicity], that’s issued here, but then, we don’t have any other information. 
The presidents of organizations answer: ‘No, you aren’t the delegates here, 
so go away because we’re not meeting people here.’ And we worked to get 
electricity to them because we’re part of them. These days, everyone takes 
control of their own group. That’s what the IDACH is today because it has 
autonomy, but the money doesn’t go through here anymore. If, for 
example, they ask the INAI [Instituto Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas or National 
Institute of Indigenous Affairs] for a project, it doesn’t go through here 
anymore. It’s as though here we’re the mother of the Law of the Aborigine 
and we turn out to be the ones who know the least about it. We’re talking 
about housing, aid, all that. The government gave new tractors to the 
organizations, not the IDACH. We still have the old tractors. It’s as though 
we don’t know how our children are being raised” (2016). 
 
The transformations that have taken place in recent years also include relationships 
between communities and the nongovernmental bodies that have worked in the area since 
the mid-1980s. In general, in conversations with the Qom, they made clear their preference 
to negotiate with the government directly because doing so aids them in obtaining larger 
projects than they generally obtain from NGOs. 
The growing mistrust between the members of these organizations has its roots in the 
difference between the projects that the communities can obtain through the government 
and NGOs. Several individuals mentioned that if the NGOs encouraged some projects and 
not others, it was because they must have an economic interest in the land. Daniel, a resident 
of Campo Medina, said the following: 
 
Our community is too mistrustful and closed to accept the INCUPO 
[Institute of Popular Culture, a Christian nonprofit civil association], 
because they say that before, when the INCUPO aided, provided advice, 
and got some projects, they took control of things . . . that’s the 
information we have (2016). 
 
During my conversations with NGO experts, they also noted that the Qom prefer to 
seek “help” from the government. Maria, a thirty-three-year-old woman who works for an 
NGO in Pampa del Indio, said that this can be explained by the greater flexibility in the 
assignation of state budgets: 
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When dealing directly with a minister or a governor, people can ask for 
what they need. The authorities assign part of the budget to the issue, and 
that’s it. Working with NGOs, in contrast, comes with more restrictions. 
The projects come with a framework that must be followed in a certain way 
within a certain period (2016). 
 
 
Figure 12. Meeting with NGOs Campo Nuevo, 2016 (Photo by Author). 
 
 
Figure 13. Meeting Campo Nuevo, 2016 (Photo by Author). 
 
During that same conversation, her colleague, Marta, who was approximately fifty, 
added that this trend had grown more common in recent years due to the personality of 
Governor Jorge M. Capitanich, who encouraged direct dialogue with indigenous 
organizations. She said: 
 
Coqui [Capitanich’s nickname] had a very personal style that the guys got 
used to. You went to the meeting, they’d say “wait,” and take out their 
cellphone and talk directly to Coqui. They only want to talk to the boss, no 
one else (2016). 
 
Finally, it is important to note that in recent years, the NGOs in the area experienced 
major institutional changes. These include institutions such as MISEROR, the German 
Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Development Cooperation, deciding that it was 
necessary to work at the regional and provincial levels rather than in the local sphere. This 
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change, encouraged by financial institutions, has seen the number of experts living in the 
area reduced as the bonus that they received for living locally was cut off. The goal is to 
concentrate staff in the provincial capital of Resistencia. 
    
Final Comments 
 
In these pages, I have argued that although there are undoubted strengths to the concept of 
accumulation by dispossession, the excessive focus placed on violence has prevented past 
analysis from reflecting on the complexity of the transformations that have taken place in 
rural areas. Indigenous populations have historically suffered dispossessions and 
displacement; in this regard, the new aspect is not the hoarding but the dynamics that govern 
these rural experiences. For this reason, I suggest no longer exploring the AbD associated 
with the expansion of agribusiness from the perspective of what it suppresses but, rather, 
from that of what it creates.  
Drawing on the arguments of Sanyal (2007) and Chatterjee (2004, 2008, 2017), I have 
examined different aspects of the new rural reality in Pampa del Indio, Chaco. We have 
observed how, in addition to facilitating the arrival of Don Panos and its operations through 
the sale of state land and granting authorization to divert the Bermejo River, as well as the 
failure to penalize illegal deforestation, the state has also implemented a series of programs 
that allowed the control and survival of excluded peoples. The simultaneous presence of 
these processes of dispossession and protection and their subsequent contradictions are 
what shape a new rural experience for these excluded peoples. 
These experiences, under processes of AbD, are thus characterized by increased social 
insecurity associated with changes in state policies. In other words, state interventions have 
guaranteed in recent decades the survival of indigenous populations but have not 
encouraged the production or employment that might ensure the long-term sustainability of 
these populations. As I have tried to show, these policies are a constitutive component of 
the state in the era of AbD. This does not mean that we should regard these interventions as 
a plan that was prepared and implemented by a homogenous dominant elite; actual policies 
involving indigenous peoples are always the result of multiple struggles that occur between 
these groups and the state as well as within these entities themselves. As Chatterjee explains 
(2004, 2008), the strategic balance of political forces varies; therefore, we observe the degree 
of social protection and dispossession varying in different periods. 
Rural processes are thus typified by highly unstable territorialities; they result from the 
proliferation of precarious, poorly paid employment and dependence on the social subsidies 
implemented by the government in power, the will of the experts of different institutions, 
and short-term NGO projects. Life in these communities thus requires continuous protest 
and struggle on the part of different community groups against the state, generating 
increasing competition for resources, greater uncertainty, and the proliferation of conflict as 
divisions multiply. 
Finally, these new rural experiences are not unchanging political processes; their specific 
characteristics always depend on political struggle and vary in accordance with the power 
relationships between the subaltern and dominant sectors. 
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Notes 
 
1Following analyses by Teubal (2008), Giarracca and Teubal (2010), and Dominguez and 
Sabatino (2006), I understand the agribusiness model as being characterized by the 
following: 1) increased control by transnational corporations and large national companies 
that produce, distribute, and sell agricultural products; 2) an increase in contract-based 
agriculture (via seeding pools and mutual investment funds); 3) an increase in the production 
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of commodities for export, to the detriment of the production of foods or industrial crops 
for domestic consumption; and 4) a growing dependence on technological packages 
(transgenic seeds, agritoxins, and machinery). 
2According to Gudynas (2010), neo-extractivism can be defined as a “style of development 
based on the appropriation of nature to feed a very undiversified productive network 
extremely dependent on the supply of raw materials overseas.” See also Svampa (2011). 
3A recent important contribution to this issue is an analysis by Vergara-Camus and Kay 
(2017) of the principal national agrarian policies of the Pink Tide Latin American 
governments. 
4I conducted the interviews presented in the second section over several different trips to 
Pampa del Indio, beginning in 2010 and running up to the present day. The large majority of 
voices belong to men between the ages of 25 and 75. Women were more reluctant to talk, 
and only those who were professionals, held a political position, or were community leaders 
agreed to be interviewed.   
The interviews mostly took place on the patios of people’s houses, using both open-ended 
and semi-structured questionnaires. Although each interview was planned to be carried out 
alone in a domestic space, family members or acquaintances already there or passing by 
often joined in the conversation. The interviews with leaders of indigenous organizations 
took place on both a one-on-one and group basis. In the latter case, they occurred in a venue 
in town and involved only men.  
On several occasions I also acted as an observer of meetings between NGO members and 
communities, which generally took place in community warehouses and/or churches located 
in rural settlements. At these meetings, men and women usually sat separately, with the men 
generally being the ones to speak in public and sign documents. The names of those 
interviewed have been changed. 
5Note that both Chatterjee and Sanyal assume the existence of capitalist economies based on 
the principle of accumulation and noncapitalist economies based on consumption. 
6It is worth pointing out that the economy of the excluded differs from precapitalist 
subsistence economies. As Sanyal explains: “The need economy is an ensemble of economic 
activities undertaken for the purpose of meeting needs, as distinct from activities driven by 
an impersonal force of systemic accumulation. It is a system of petty commodity production 
but not the one that precedes capital in the historicist narrative of transition. It is an effect of 
capital, its inescapable outcome—a non-capitalist economic space that is integral to the post-
colonial capitalist formation” (Sanyal 2007, 209). 
7The provincial governor was Jorge Milton Capitanich, who was also appointed head of the 
National Cabinet from 2013–15. Gustavo Karasiuk was the local mayor. 
8Braunstein (2008) defines a banda as “a group of relatives without a unilinear or local focus. 
i.e. the members would live together in the same place be it stable or not.” They are 
described as being bilateral or non-unilinear because no distinction was made between 
maternal or paternal lines. 
9Currently, among the different rural settlements in Pampa del Indio (Campo Medina, 
Campo Nuevo, Lote 4, Cuarta Legua, Pampa Chica, Lote 3, Campo Alemán, Tres Lagunas, 
La Herradura and 10 de Mayo) the Qom occupy between 8,000 and 9,000 hectares of land, 
and there is more than one family group on every lot (interviews with representatives from 
the Instituto de Desarrollo Social y Promoción Humana [Institute for Social Development and 
Humanitarian Support, INDES], the NGO created at the beginning of the 1970s to help 
strengthen community organizations and manage development projects, 2012). 
10The Comisión Zonal de Tierras and the Asociación Civil Cacique Taigoyic were founded in 
the early 1990s. The groups were originally linked to the ENDEPA (National Team of 
Pastoral Aborigines) and INCUPO (Institute of Popular Culture), a Christian nonprofit civil 
association. The Unión Campesina was born in 2001 and is linked to the Revolutionary 
Communist Party (PCR). Other organizations in Pampa del Indio include the indigenous 
organization Lqataxac Nam Qompi (Qompi Council) and the organization of indigenous 
women, Nate’elpi Nsoquiaxanaxanapi (Madres Cuidadoras de la Cultura Qom or Mother 
Caretakers of Qom Culture). 
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11The IDACH is an autonomous body founded in 1987 by Law 3258. Its main function is to 
represent the indigenous communities in Chaco Province. 
12The conflict started in March 2008 after Resolution 125/08 was announced by the Ministry 
of the Economy, increasing the percentage of retentions (taxes on exports) on certain 
commodities. More specifically, this resolution established a structure of mobile values that 
changed in accordance with international prices over a four-year period. In the case of 
soybeans, the increase in the share increased from 35% to 44%. Representatives of the four 
traditional organizations in the sector (the Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA), the Confederaciones 
Rurales Argentinas (CRA), the Federación Agraria Argentina (FAA) and the Confederación de 
Asociaciones Rurales de Buenos Aires y La Pampa (CARBAP)) immediately rejected this measure. 
These groups argued that the government was assessing excessive taxes and thus decided to 
stop selling grains until the government withdrew the resolution. They also organized 
marches and roadblocks, leading to a scarcity of food and a significant rise in prices. The 
conflict lasted until July, when, amid strong opposition, the national government sent the 
resolution to be approved by congress. It was the vice president, a representative of Radical 
Civic Union (UCR), who cast the deciding vote to veto the law (Petras and Veltmeyer 2016). 
13To receive the Asignación Universal por Hijo, families had to register their child at school and 
for healthcare checkups. It is given for each child up to the age of eighteen, for up to a 
maximum of five children. 
14The Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (National Institute of Agricultural 
Technology) is a decentralized state body with operational and financial autonomy run by 
the Ministry of Agro-industry. 
15I am grateful to one of the anonymous Tipití reviewers for this observation. 
16See “Pampa del Indio. Siete detenidos. Continúa el corte de ruta” (Pampa del Indio. Seven 
arrested. Roadblock continues) at  
http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2014/02/855430.php. Accessed 05 May 2018. 
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